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Note: This article expresses the views of the authors and not of the Massachusetts Office 
of the Attorney General (MAGO).  This article is not an official document of the MAGO or its 
Non-Profit Organizations/Public Charities Division (NPCD).  The article raises questions, 
highlights issues and presents discussion points, but does not provide, nor is it intended to 
provide, conclusive answers.  It is not guidance or official policy of the MAGO or NPCD and it 
should not be relied upon as guidance with respect to the issues discussed nor is it an indication 
of how the MAGO or NPCD may view circumstances presented to them in their official 
capacity.  The reader should be aware that the MAGO, and for that matter, any attorney 
general’s office, may view health care policy issues through more than one lens, including the 
perspectives of antitrust law, health care law and policy, and from a legislative perspective.  
This article discusses issues solely through the charity lens from the personal perspective of two 




Under the common law in most jurisdictions, the attorney general as charities regulator 
is mandated to oversee the due application of charitable funds and to ensure that directors, 
trustees and other fiduciaries of public charities fulfill their fiduciary duties.
1
  In the health care 
context, attorneys general have been called upon most prominently in recent years to apply 
charities law in proposed “conversions” of charitable health care entities to for-profit ownership 
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 In Massachusetts, this duty is codified as follows: “The attorney general shall enforce the due application of 
funds given or appropriated to public charities within the Commonwealth and prevent breaches of trust in the 





  In addition, questions have been raised as to the consistency of certain 
compensation arrangements with the due application of charitable funds and with fulfillment of 
fiduciary duties.  For example, high executive or physician compensation packages have been 
questioned as potentially inconsistent with fiduciary duties owed by the executives and the 
board members approving such arrangements.  Compensation and other arrangements between 
and among charitable health care entities have also been questioned as to whether they violate 
fiduciary duties.  Business conduct of some health care charities has been questioned as to 
whether it is somehow inconsistent with charitable status or violates a duty to charitable 
mission.   
These “fiduciary duty” questions and conversion transactions require charities regulators 
to apply traditional charities law standards to fact situations that are arguably susceptible to 
varying interpretations and characterizations.  Complexity and rapid change in the health care 
sector contribute to difficulty in discerning how charities law standards should be applied in 
particular cases.  Some have argued that changes in public policy, government oversight and 
legal requirements in the health care arena should affect the interpretation of charities standards 
and analysis in health care.   
In Massachusetts, the MAGO has traditionally played a role as “honest broker” of 
information and assessment of aspects of the health care market.
3
  At the same time, the Office 
enforces consumer protection, antitrust and other legal standards in addition to charities law.  
Analyses of the same fact situation from these different legal perspectives can lead to differing 
conclusions.  Health oversight agencies such as the Department of Public Health and the 
Division of Insurance bring their own standards and analyses to bear when their jurisdiction is 
implicated.  Recent enactment of significant changes in our state health care system oversight 
structures,
4
 coupled with federal health law and policy changes, create the potential for still 
other views from government regulators about the desirability, appropriateness and 
permissibility of certain health care transactions, business relationships and payment 
arrangements that may present questions under charities law. 
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 A health care “for-profit conversion” is the sale of all or a substantial part of the assets of a charitable entity, 
typically a hospital, health maintenance organization or other health care provider, to a for-profit corporation, 
with a resulting change in purpose or dissolution of the seller charity.  For the sake of simplicity, our discussion 
will focus on hospital conversions. 
3
 For example, Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley has, since assuming office in 2007, prioritized 
transparency of information on all public charities, and created a Health Care Division to focus even more 
specifically on this sector.  In 2008, the legislature granted the MAGO special authority to examine why health 
care costs increase faster than general inflation.  Since then, the office has produced reports on health care cost 
trends and drivers and continues to analyze and report on the health care system.  See, e.g., Office of Attorney 
General Martha Coakley, Examination of Health Care Cost Trends and Cost Drivers Pursuant to G.L. c. 118G, 
§ 6½(b): Report for Annual Public Hearing , March 16, 2010, available at 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/final-report-w-cover-appendices-glossary.pdf, and Office of Attorney 
General Martha Coakley, Examination of Health Care Cost Trends and Cost Drivers Pursuant to G.L. c. 118G, 
§ 6½(b): Report for Annual Public Hearing, June 22, 2011, available at 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/2011-hcctd-full.pdf.  These developments built on previous 
legislative requests that the MAGO evaluate business practices of health care public charities for consistency 
with charitable status and exercise of fiduciary duties.  See Attorney General Reilly’s September 12, 2001 
“Report to the Legislature on the Springfield Health Care Market” available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20051224002108/http://www.ago.state.ma.us/filelibrary/Sphealth.pdf. 
4
 An Act Improving the Quality of Health Care and Reducing Cost Through Increased Transparency, Efficiency 
and Innovation, Chapter 224 of the Acts of 2012, (hereafter “Chapter 224”) referenced in Part III below.  
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Rapid change in the health care sector and in government’s oversight, regulation and 
mode of participation in it may create opportunities to re-evaluate the role of charities law in 
health care.  Does this environment call on charities regulators to incorporate new factors, such 
as public interest or consistency with health care public policy, into their analyses?  Or, does it 
call on us to apply requirements, such as devotion of assets solely to charitable purpose, strictly 
and without regard to changes in the environment, lest the line between charitable mission and 
private gain become blurred in the health care context?  From yet another perspective, does it 
create an opportunity to incorporate charities law standards into substantive health sector 
oversight and regulation, or opportunities for active collaboration between charities regulators 
and health care sector regulators? We examine these and related questions first through 
discussion of recent charitable hospital conversions, focusing on the application of cy pres 
doctrine and fiduciary duty analysis.  Second, we discuss evaluation of compensation practices.  
Thereafter we discuss examples of fiduciary duty analysis in the context of business 
arrangements and practices.  We offer no definitive conclusions, but hope to illuminate the 
questions through real and hypothetical examples and to provoke constructive dialog that can 
inform charities regulators confronting health care questions and cases in this environment of 
rapid change. 
 
I. HOSPITAL CONVERSIONS 
 
Charitable hospital representatives say that they feel pressure to explore conversion 
alongside other strategic options as a means of accessing necessary capital funding and as a 
means of establishing connections they perceive as necessary for survival in the changing health 
care marketplace.
5
  With respect to capital funding, for example, some not-for-profit hospitals 
may believe that they will be unable to obtain from prospective not-for-profit partners the 
substantial resources necessary to implement electronic medical records and other information 
systems they believe they need in order to manage services for a defined patient population or 
for other public policy goals or requirements as contemplated by federal health care initiatives,
6
 
including the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”).7  Many charitable 
hospitals have experienced low or negative operating margins for years, causing them to defer 
ordinary capital expenditures for property and plant maintenance.  Faced with the combination 
of accumulated “ordinary” capital needs and newer technology investments they believe are 
required, hospital representatives have said that the pressure to find a source for capital 
investment is now far greater than in the past and that this pressure exceeds ordinary business 
challenges such as delivering quality services efficiently at low cost.   
 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., Robert Weisman, Hospitals Strained in a Changing Landscape, BOSTON GLOBE, September 8, 2012. 
6
 Examples of federal health care programs and requirements cited as calling for significant new capital 
investment include the so-called “Meaningful Use” incentive program of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, implementing Title IV of Division B of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5 (2009) (encouraging adoption of electronic health records), and demonstration 
projects or initiatives authorized by the Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010) (e.g., Medicare 
Shared Savings program, Pioneer Accountable Care Organization program). 
7
  Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). 
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A. The Attorney General’s Role 
When a charitable hospital proposes to sell its assets to a for-profit entity, the attorney 
general’s jurisdiction to see to the due application of charitable assets is implicated.  The 
attorney general may act under a specific state for-profit conversion statute or common law.  In 
addition, the health department or other hospital licensing authority in a state may oversee the 
transfer of a hospital’s operating license and may conduct public hearings in carrying out this 
function.  While attorney general’s office and health department staff may coordinate in 
reviewing proposed transactions, their roles and the standards they apply in review are separate 
and distinct.  The attorney general’s role derives from more general legal authority grounded in 
charities law, while the health department’s role derives from authority specific to oversight of 
health care providers.
8
   
 
B. Legal Standards and Principles: cy pres 
Where attorneys general are called upon to consider modification of a charitable trust, 
they employ the cy pres doctrine.  Cy pres means “as near as possible” and is the legal doctrine 
that requires charitable funds to be used according to the charitable purposes for which they are 
held, unless it is impossible, impracticable, or illegal to continue to do so. If it is impossible, 
impracticable, or illegal to carry out the original charitable purpose, court approval is usually 
required to change the way the funds are used, and the changed purposes must be as near to the 
original purposes as possible. 
The law has been unsettled as to whether, and to what extent, the assets of charitable 
corporations are held in trust and thus whether cy pres and other charitable trust doctrines apply 
to charitable corporations.  In Attorney General v. Hahnemann Hospital, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court held that a charitable hospital corporation could broaden its purposes by 
amending its charter, but that the corporation could not use unrestricted funds received prior to 
the charter amendment for purposes added in the charter amendment.
9
  Hahnemann, in effect, 
treated unrestricted assets of a charitable corporation as held in trust for the purposes stated in 
the charitable corporation’s charter. A number of states have relied on Hahnemann to apply cy 
pres principles to conversions of health care charitable corporations.
10
 
                                                 
8
 In Attorney General v. Hahnemann Hospital, 397 Mass. 820, 494 N.E.2d 1011 (1986), the court refuted 
Hahnemann’s argument that its proposed sale of its assets was governed exclusively by health care statutes and 
that Attorney General had no authority, noting that there is no “overlap in the general regulatory authority of the 
Attorney General over charitable corporations and the specific authority of the Department of Public Health 
over health care.” Hahnemann, 397 Mass. at 829, 494 N.E.2d at 1017 n.13. 
9
 Hahnemann, supra note 8, 397 Mass. at 834-36, 494 N.E.2d at 1020–21. 
10 See, e.g., Banner Health System v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242 (S.D. 2003) (general corporate assets subject to a 
hospital conversion might be subject to an implied charitable trust).  Similarly, other courts have held that 
general corporate assets are held in trust for furthering charter purposes.  Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 
Cal. App. 3d 359, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (hospital corporation could not abandon its primary purpose to 
establish free medical clinics); Blocker v. State, 718 S.W.2d 409, 415 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (unrestricted gifts 
were impressed with a charitable trust to be used consistent with the purposes declared in the corporate charter).  
See also Section 2(3) of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act and associated comments 
(written documents used at the time of a gift, including solicitation materials or organizational documents, can 





In July 1998, the National Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”) adopted a 
model “Nonprofit Healthcare Conversion” act (the “NAAG Model Act”)11 based on the 
experiences of the attorneys general in California, Ohio, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, 
who had applied the cy pres model to hospital conversions in their states.
12
  Since then, 
conversion statutes have been enacted in 24 states,
13
 many of them relying on a cy pres model 
based on the NAAG Model Act.
14
  Under a cy pres analysis, a charitable hospital must carry on 
its operations in charitable form unless the hospital can demonstrate that continued operation is 
impossible, impracticable, or illegal without a sale of its assets.
15
   
A cy pres analysis of the impracticability of a charitable hospital’s survival examines not 
only the circumstances giving rise to the hospital’s proposal to sell, but also whether there exist 
reasonably viable charitable alternatives to fulfill the hospital’s purposes, including mergers 
and/or strategic alliances with other not-for-profit hospital systems and alternative transactions 
with for-profit or not-for-profit partners such as the disposition of a subset of assets, leases, or 
                                                 
11
  NAAG Model Act for Nonprofit Healthcare Conversion Transactions, available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-state/pdf/state-practices/at-healthc_conv_guidelines.pdf. 
12 Accord, MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 440 (2004): “[T]he English 
rule that the assets of charitable corporations are subject to the doctrines of cy pres and deviation, regardless of 
their source, and regardless of whether they were given subject to explicit restrictions, is clearly preferable.”  
Contrary to the English rule, however, the common law of some states without conversion statutes does not 
recognize the corporate cy pres doctrine.  See draft ALI Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, 
which take the position that a charity can change the purpose to which unrestricted assets are devoted by 
amending its governing documents to change its corporate purpose, regardless of the extent of the change.  
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 400, cmt. (d)(3) (American Law Institute, Preliminary Draft 
No. 5, 2009) (stating, “a facially unrestricted gift made to a charity having a single, narrow purpose is not 
viewed as a restricted gift.  Rather, a donor’s desire that the gift be used for a specific purpose must be 
expressed, in writing, in order for the recipient charity to be bound to use that gift for that purpose.”). 
13
 There are conversion statutes in Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
14
 Conversion statutes in the following states are patterned after the NAAG Model Act cy pres model, requiring 
that conversion proceeds are utilized for purposes consistent with the selling hospital’s purposes: California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wisconsin.  The Pennsylvania Attorney General also has posted a hospital conversion protocol 
on her web site which mirrors the NAAG Model Act cy pres model, available at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/consumers.aspx?id=229.  However, conversion statutes in Arizona, North 
Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia do not follow the NAAG cy pres model.  See also draft ALI Principles of 
the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 12, which take the position that a charity can change the 




  A.W. SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS §§ 381, 399 (4th ed. 1987).  Under the Massachusetts conversion statute, Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 180, § 8A(d), the MAGO reviews transactions involving the sale or transfer of non-profit 
hospital assets or operations to for-profit entities.  Section 8A(d)(1) provides, in part: “A nonprofit acute-care 
hospital . . . shall give written notice of not less than 90 days to the attorney general . . . before it enters into a 
sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of a substantial amount of its assets or operations with a person or 
entity other than a public charity.  . . . When investigating the proposed transaction, the attorney general shall 
consider any factors that the attorney general deems relevant, including, but not limited to, whether: (i) the 
proposed transaction complies with applicable general nonprofit and charities law; (ii) due care was followed by 
the nonprofit entity; (iii) conflict of interest was avoided by the nonprofit entity at all phases of decision 






  Assessment of whether any available not-for-profit alternatives are actually 
“viable,” however, is not always straightforward.  For example, the conversion applicant may 
assert that a potential not-for-profit bidder’s proposal to acquire its assets is not viable because 
the bidder’s financial condition is not robust enough to meet the capital needs of the resulting 
combined charitable entity.  Evaluation of such an assertion may require regulators to assess 
whether projected capital needs are truly “necessary” for the post-transaction not-for-profit 
entity’s survival.  If the necessity of projected expenditures is tied to a particular view of how 
the health care market is likely to develop – in terms of competitive pressure or anticipated 
health care regulation – such as investment in information systems to manage population health, 
for example, charities regulators may be called upon to assess whether the applicant’s view of 
future market demands is reasonable or not.  This assessment may require input from health 
care market experts and health care policy experts. 
If sale of the not-for-profit hospital is permissible because the hospital’s continued 
operation is impossible or impracticable and there are no reasonably viable not-for-profit 
alternatives, the cy pres doctrine requires that any proceeds resulting from the for-profit 
conversion must be used for purposes as near as possible to the historical purposes of the 
converting hospital.
17
 Sale proceeds could be used to meet unmet health needs of the same class 
of beneficiaries in the selling hospital’s geographic region, such as screening, health promotion, 
providing access to care, subsidizing insurance premiums, or free care.  Given the financial 
distress of many not-for-profit hospitals, however, the fair market value of the assets transferred 
is sometimes equal to the outstanding liabilities of the hospital, and accordingly there may be 
little or no sale proceeds left to allocate for charitable purposes. 
 
C. Legal Standards and Principles: Duties of Care and Loyalty 
An attorney general evaluating an application for conversion will also examine whether 
the selling hospital’s board and managers have satisfied their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty 
in connection with a proposed conversion.  The attorney general must ensure that the selling 
hospital board members have satisfied their duty of due care by determining whether: (i) the 
proposal is in the best interest of the not-for-profit hospital; (ii) fair value will be received for 
the hospital’s assets; and (iii) the proposed transaction terms are fair and adequately protect the 
hospital’s interest.  While the standard to be met under the “due care” analysis is arguably less 
specific or stringent than the “impossible or impracticable” standard under a cy pres analysis, 
evaluation of the board’s exercise of due care may involve assessment of the same kinds of 
assumptions about the future demands and requirements that the changing health care business 
and regulatory environment are placing on charitable hospitals. 
An attorney general must also assess whether the selling hospital’s board and managers 
fulfill their duty of loyalty, which requires them to keep the interest of the selling hospital above 
their own or any other interests.  Thus, fiduciaries of the selling hospital must avoid conflicts of 
                                                 
16
  Some argue that application of the cy pres “impracticability” standard should be limited to the determination 
that the hospital cannot continue in its current not-for-profit form and that a lower “best interest of the hospital” 
standard should apply to the decision whether to sell all assets to a for-profit purchaser.  More thorough 
application of the cy pres standard requires a determination that all not-for-profit proposals for sale or 
continuation of the hospital are “impracticable” before allowing a for-profit conversion. 
17
  SCOTT, supra note 15, §§ 381, 399. 
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interest resulting from divided loyalties that could place them in a position to control or 
influence the selling hospital’s decision-making process for their own personal benefit.  This 
could occur, for example, if a bidder makes promises of future employment, consulting 
contracts, or other financial benefit to the selling hospital’s board members or senior managers 
in return for their support for the prospective purchaser’s bid.  An attorney general’s analysis of 
the proposed transaction includes careful examination of the hospital board’s and senior 
managers’ conflict of interest disclosure, assessment and management process during the 
consideration of conversion and alternatives.  Potentially more challenging is assessment of the 
role of physician leaders and their interests in informing and influencing the board’s assessment 
of a proposed conversion transaction and alternatives. 
 
D. Emerging Standard: the Public’s Interest 
The NAAG Model Act
18
 and the state conversion statutes it spawned have also 
expanded on the conversion analysis to add evaluation by the attorney general of whether the 
proposed transaction is in the public interest.
19
  This has resulted in attorney general 
consideration of the impact the transaction may have on the hospital’s traditional patient 
community (likely to be most directly affected) and on the health care system overall, including 
affordability and availability of services (especially for indigent patients or those with care 
needs that are historically under-reimbursed such as behavioral health services).   
The addition of this “public interest” analysis expands an attorney general’s role in 
conversion oversight from one based purely on charities (and charitable trust) law to one that 
includes a broader set of considerations.  This development could be seen as an indication that 
charities law, or at least application of charitable trust principles, may not be sufficient to fully 
analyze a proposed health care conversion transaction, without specifically directing how the 
public’s interest should be assessed or weighed in the analysis. 
 Attorneys general reviewing proposed hospital conversions under a statute that included 
this “public interest” aspect have sometimes conditioned their approval of the transactions on 
enforceable purchase contracts that require the purchasing for-profit hospital system to 
affirmatively address health care issues (for example, requiring maintenance of charity care 
commitments and of certain critical access services for a period of time after the acquisition).
20
  
Attorneys general have also sometimes required the insertion of contract provisions allowing 
the selling hospital or the community to buy back the hospital under certain circumstances as 
                                                 
18
 Section 5.02 of the NAAG Model Act, supra note 11, is an optional provision for “Attorneys General who 
deem it appropriate to also consider issues of health impact,” including availability, accessibility or cost of 
health care.  Conversion statutes in the following states have included evaluation of health impact in addition to 
a cy pres analysis: California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.  The Pennsylvania Attorney General’s hospital conversion 
protocol also includes evaluation of public health impact as well as a cy pres analysis; available at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/consumers.aspx?id=229. 
Conversion statutes enacted by Arizona, North Carolina, and Virginia evaluate issues of health impact but do 
not require a cy pres analysis. 
19
  For example, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 180, § 8A(d), supra note 15. 
20
  See, e.g., Office of Attorney General Martha Coakley, Statement of the Attorney General as to the Caritas 




well as “anti-flip” provisions providing that the selling hospital or community will share in any 
profit above the original purchase price if the for-profit buyer resells the hospital in a short 
period of time.
21
  Finally, as some statutes expressly require, attorneys general can support 
transparency and public input into the process by, for example, posting transaction documents 
on the attorney general’s website and hosting public hearings to obtain input about particular 
concerns the community may have about the transaction (which the attorney general may then 




E. Emerging Issues 
Assessing whether it is truly “impossible or impracticable” for a charitable hospital to 
continue operating in charitable form may be challenging if the applicant presents with a robust 
bottom line but claims “impracticability” based on changes in the market or perceived demands 
that are about to develop.  A hospital board may believe that if it does not seek acquisition or 
some other form of “tight” affiliation with a larger health system, it is unlikely to survive 
emerging “bundled payment” systems or will be unable to manage health services for a defined 
population (and that it will be called upon to do so, in collaboration with physicians).  The 
board may even determine that exercise of due care requires it to respond to changes in the 
health care environment by identifying and evaluating affiliation or acquisition models, even if 
it is not in immediate financial distress.  Once the board’s discussions move from an assessment 
of the health care environment to an assessment of its affiliation options, there may be 
momentum leading the board to determine that some form of affiliation is inevitable.  Once that 
threshold is crossed, the board may engage in a comparison of options to determine which one 
looks “best” only to find that a for-profit suitor’s proposal looks most appealing.23  At what 
point along this slippery slope should a true assessment of impossibility or impracticability by 
the board occur? 
As charities regulators, how much deference should we give to a board’s determination 
in these circumstances that it is truly impossible or impracticable to continue operating the 
charitable hospital “as is”?  Should we require that the board consider forms of affiliation that 
stop short of an asset sale?  As a general rule, affiliations of any form between charities with the 
same mission do not come before charities regulators for the type of review conducted in 
conversion transactions.  If the hypothetical board described above chooses a not-for-profit 
                                                 
21
  See Section 12.2.4 of October 31, 2002 Asset Purchase Agreement between Nashoba Community Hospital 
Corporation and Essent Health Care-Ayer, Inc. providing for a Nashoba option to repurchase, available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20051224011609/http://www.ago.state.ma.us/filelibrary/nashobaapa.pdf, along with 
the attached parties’ agreed-to Form of Option to Repurchase Agreement, available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20051224002108/http://www.ago.state.ma.us/filelibrary/Sphealth.pdf. 
22
  See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 180, § 8A(d)(2) and (3) (requiring MAGO to make available to the public all 
documents filed by parties to a proposed conversion transaction and to hold a public hearing in a location 
convenient to the population served by the selling charity). 
23
  See, e.g., Robert Weisman, Beth Israel Plans to Acquire Jordan Hospital in Plymouth, BOSTON GLOBE, 
January 24, 2013 (quoting Jordan Hospital president Peter Holden, “‘We just said we’re not big enough to be 
able to take the health care of the population and be at risk for it and have the resources to get there with the 
transformation of health care. . . . We wanted to make sure there was a vibrant health care system in Plymouth 
for generations to come,’” and noting that “teaming up with a nonprofit hospital system ‘was not a requirement 
but it was a definite plus’”). 
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partner, it will not be called upon to articulate the basis of its decision to affiliate.  There is no 
application of an “impossible or impracticable” standard.   
How should charities regulators assess the determination by a conversion applicant’s 
board that available not-for-profit options were “not viable”?24  What if the board determines 
that a for-profit partner will provide better access to capital, better payer contracts, and better 
clinical integration than any of the available not-for-profit options?  May it select the for-profit 
“conversion” option because it believes it is in the “best interest” of the hospital?  Charities law 
would say, generally, no.  Must it first show some reason why each of the not-for-profit options 
is not likely to preserve the hospital’s health care mission?  Charities law would say, generally, 
yes. 
In the case of Morton Hospital in Massachusetts, for example, the board determined for 
various specific reasons that the mission it was required to protect was maintenance of a full-
service hospital in its community.
25
  It had no charitable prospective partner or purchaser that 
would preserve that mission, and therefore proceeded with sale to a for-profit hospital operator.  
It is possible, however, that there might have been charitable partners willing to enter into a sale 
or affiliation that would have retained the hospital’s charitable nature, but would have 
diminished the clinical services provided in its facilities and therefore in its community.  Might 
the board have determined that the latter option was viable?  Perhaps, but it did not do so.  In 
the Morton Hospital case, we determined not to second-guess the board’s reasonable construal 
of its mission, based on the particular facts in that situation.  But a different board might have 
reached a different conclusion about the competing priorities of holding charitable assets 
charitable, and serving the health care needs of the community in the way most closely aligned 
with its historic mission.  How far should charities regulators push to maintain charitable status, 
even where fundamental change in the nature of services available at the resulting charitable 
hospital will result? 
Sometimes assessment of “viability” of other options turns on application of other legal 
standards.  To what extent should charities regulators defer to a board’s assessment that other 
legal requirements render a not-for-profit option “non-viable”?  For example, if a board 
determines, on its own, that acquisition by the only charitable bidder would likely have run 
afoul of antitrust law or would have led to organizational “culture clash,” should charities 
officials defer to that determination and conclude that the charitable bid was not viable? 
As our state and national governments struggle to control health care cost increases, 
provide broad access to high-quality care, and experiment with new ways of financing, 
organizing and overseeing the health care system, where should the charitable cy pres standard 
for preserving charitable assets fall in the hierarchy of policy goals?  As government plays a 
larger role in health care financing through Medicare, Medicaid, government employee health 
                                                 
24
  For example, see discussion of viability of not-for-profit options in the Morton Hospital transaction in 
Massachusetts.  Office of Attorney General Martha Coakley, Statement of the Attorney General as to the 
Morton Hospital Transaction at 9 and 25 (2011) (hereafter, the Morton Statement), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/nonprofit/morton/morton-ag-statement.pdf. 
25
  See the Morton Statement, supra note 24, at 9 and 21 (finding that it was not unreasonable for the Morton 
Hospital board to find that continuation of its mission required maintenance of a full-service hospital in its 
community, because it determined that residents of its service area would be unlikely to travel to receive 




benefit programs, tax expenditures and subsidies, as well as in regulation and oversight, is there 
some point at which the charitable “health care” mission should be broadened to include 
“relieving the burdens of government,” or would that risk diluting the health care mission?  If 
we begin to view those purposes as aligned, can we say that they have become joined by virtue 
of changes in the health care environment, or is court approval required?
26
  Is there the potential 
for tension between the charities law perspective that charitable assets should remain held in 
trust, and a health care regulatory perspective that, as long as health care sector participants 
comply with comprehensive health care regulation aimed at controlling costs, providing access 
and ensuring quality, then they are relieving the burdens of government and acting in the public 
interest, and for-profit vs. charitable status is less important?  Alternatively, does the rise of 
health care sector regulation that applies to for-profit and charitable participants alike make it 
even more important for charities regulators to hold fast to strict interpretation of charitable 
mission, in order to avoid dissipation of charitable assets into private interests through 
conversions or other transactions approved under a general health care oversight regime? 
 
II. COMPENSATION PRACTICES 
 
Generous compensation practices among public charities have raised questions about 
whether charitable funds are being appropriately applied and about whether duties of care or 
loyalty have been violated in the construction of arrangements leading to high levels of 
compensation.  Concerns have been raised about whether the process outlined in IRC § 4958 
and related regulations has led to or at least supported an acceleration of the rate of increase in 
executive compensation among public charities. 
27
 
In the health care arena, for-profit and charitable entities sometimes provide similar 
services and conduct similar activities “side by side.”  As a general matter, members of the 
public and the press may expect that salaries will be higher in for-profit enterprises than in 
public charities.  Where they are in direct competition with for-profits, charities representatives 
have said that they feel compelled to increase compensation in order to avoid losing top talent – 
executives or physicians – to more generous compensation offers from for-profit competitors. 
To avoid charges of private inurement and “excess benefit transactions,” charitable 
health care entities must refrain from paying more than “fair market value” for services.  
However, if a for-profit competitor of a charitable hospital, for example, – not bound by the 
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citations omitted). 
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same “fair market value” legal requirement – offers key physicians considerably more in 
compensation in hopes of wooing them away, is the hospital justified in matching the offer even 
if it exceeds what market studies would generally support?  What defines “market value” more 
precisely than a competing offer, they might argue? 
On the other hand, matching a high offer from a competitor for physician services could 
lead to unsustainable system costs – both for the charitable hospital itself and ultimately for the 
health care system as a whole.  Charity board members in this circumstance clearly would need 
to use due care to weigh the risk of over-committing to physicians at the expense of other 
aspects of operations, against the risk of losing key physician talent, leadership and clinical 
capacity.  From a broader perspective, do charity board members also owe a fiduciary duty to 
avoid matching higher compensation offers where it is not clear that competition in the market 
is functioning to restrain costs?  Do board members of charitable hospitals owe a duty of some 
kind to the larger mission of health care – for example, to avoid taking actions that might 
contribute to cost increases without a discernible increase in quality or access – that is not owed 
by boards of for-profit hospitals or health systems?  
 
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
 
In addition to examining fiduciary duties in the context of conversions and 
compensation decisions, attorneys general have been called upon to examine whether certain 
aspects of market conduct are consistent with fiduciary duties.  Often this involves examining 
the extent to which collaboration, activities and expenditures further the charitable purpose or 
mission of the organization.   
In Lifespan Corporation v. New England Medical Center, Inc.,
28
 the MAGO intervened 
in a case in which New England Medical Center (NEMC, now called Tufts Medical Center) 
alleged that its one-time corporate parent, the Rhode Island-based Lifespan, had breached 
fiduciary duties it owed to NEMC by virtue of the control it exercised over NEMC as its sole 
corporate member.  The court held that Lifespan did owe a fiduciary duty to NEMC
29
 and that it 
had breached that duty by, among other things, failing to ensure that payer rates would increase 
at a reasonable level in comparison to other members of the Lifespan system.
30
 
The Lifespan decision has raised questions about whether board members of corporate 
parents generally owe fiduciary duties to subsidiaries, and about how to evaluate the interests 
and missions of subsidiary entities in larger corporate families, as distinct from the interests and 
missions of the system as a whole. 
 As health care entities form new affiliations for purposes of clinical care or 
financial risk-sharing, similar questions of fiduciary duty may arise.  Particularly where 
charities and for-profits join together in an affiliation or joint venture,
31
 the differentiation of 
duties and mission of the constituent entities as distinct from the collaborative enterprise may be 
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challenging.  For example, if a charitable hospital joins with for-profit physician groups to share 
patient care revenues, is it justifiable for hospital representatives on the board of the joint 
venture to support payment of subsidies to the physician groups in order to support higher 
salaries for the physicians, even if it means a reduction in the amount paid to the hospital?  
Could hospital leaders reasonably conclude that such revenue sharing actually furthers the 
hospital’s mission because it will result in or increase physician engagement in appropriate care 
management under the joint venture’s clinical guidelines, which in turn will support the system 
and the hospital?
32
   
Put another way, as health care re-organizes under different affiliation and payment 
models, it may become difficult to differentiate between the mission of the hospital and the 
missions of other related parts of a larger entity or organization.  IRS guidance on joint ventures 
involving tax-exempt and non-exempt partners suggests that the exempt entity must ensure that 
its charitable resources are used exclusively in furtherance of its charitable mission, and that the 
charity must retain governance rights in the joint venture that allow it to ensure that this 
restriction on the use of its assets is maintained.
33
  But where hospital leaders believe that health 
care public policy seeks to combine hospital and physician efforts and interests, it may be 
difficult to determine where the hospital’s mission ends in the joint venture’s set of activities.  
As boards struggle with these new models and with positioning their charitable hospitals for 
survival, they must work to support the success of their collaborations as well as their hospitals.  




In the context of payment reform, some believe that health care organizations are 
expected to share financial risk for services, including services they do not directly provide.  In 
Massachusetts, new legislation requires that before a health care provider enters into an 
alternative payment arrangement in which payments may exceed the cost of care, the provider 
must submit detailed financial information to the Division of Insurance and demonstrate that it 
can maintain solvency in light of the risk it proposes to assume.
35
  Could a charitable hospital 
point to its board-restricted endowment – accumulated contributions for general hospital 
purposes, not more narrowly-restricted gifts – as financial resources available to support 
entering into risk-bearing arrangements with other types of providers and with insurers?  We 
have seen that under Massachusetts law, while a hospital may add purposes to its charter, it may 
not expend assets donated for its original purposes for dissimilar purposes added later. 
36
 In this 
                                                 
32
  A recent IRS Private Letter Ruling found that the provision of data reports by an exempt entity operating a 
regional health information exchange for use in a physician incentive compensation program was consistent 
with exempt purposes because incentive compensation program was designed to further government health care 
policy and thus lessen the burdens of government and any private benefit resulting to the physicians was 
insubstantial.  The discussion implicitly recognizes that incentive compensation of physicians is not inconsistent 
with charitable purposes, in light of larger health policy goals such as ensuring quality of care.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
201250025 (December 14, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1250025.pdf. 
33
  See Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974. 
34
  The American Hospital Association has asked the IRS to reconsider restrictions on the private business use of 
space in facilities financed by tax-exempt bonds.  In the context of ACOs, the AHA argues, exempt purposes 
and private business purposes of ACO partners are one and the same.  See AHA Letter to Tim Jones, Branch V 
Chief Counsel, Financial Institutions and Products, Internal Revenue Service dated November 15, 2012, 
available at http://www.aha.org/letters/2012?p=2. 
35
  Chapter 224, supra note 4, §15. 
36
  Hahnemann, supra notes 8 and 9. 
13 
 
context, though, hospital leaders may argue that public policy and the marketplace have 
required that hospitals include risk-sharing and relationships with other provider types as part of 
their purpose.  Is this kind of externally imposed modification of mission so dissimilar as to 
require the same restrictions on gifts donated prior to the change?  How much flexibility do 
hospital boards have in interpreting their missions broadly?  Some states have recognized a duty 
of obedience to mission or corporate purpose that suggests limitations may be stricter in some 




IV. CHANGING NATURE OF HEALTH CARE OVERSIGHT 
 
Change in health care and in the definitional predicate associated with charitable health 
care missions is not new.  But the role of government in health care financing and system 
oversight is taking on increased prevalence.  Massachusetts’ new “cost containment law” sets 
statewide targets for health spending growth that are tied to the expected rate of economic 
growth in the state.
38
  It creates new oversight bodies with authority to intervene in the health 
care market if the system-wide target cost trend is not being met.  Is it reasonable to foresee a 
point at which the charitable purpose of “health care” will be so closely aligned with the 
purpose of “relieving the burdens of government” that actions consistent with health care public 
policy goals should be deemed consistent with traditional charitable health care purposes?   
If public policy encourages new forms of joint venturing in health care, should existing 
guidelines governing charitable and non-charitable joint ventures – such as the requirement that 
charitable entities retain governance rights sufficient to protect application of their charitable 
resources, which may conflict with other sources of governance requirements – be viewed more 
flexibly, as long as the joint venture as a whole operates in furtherance of health policy goals 
and is subject to health system regulator oversight?  Or can existing guidelines adequately 
protect the charity? 
If the goal of restricting health care cost increases is to succeed, will opportunities for 
private inurement and operation for private benefit be curtailed, regardless of ownership 
structure?  Is it possible that at some point, comprehensive health care system oversight will 
effectively require the system to operate for the public good rather than for private benefit?  Or, 
will other changes in the health care arena result in more effective competition in the market, 
thereby restraining costs irrespective of ownership model?  
At this time, of course, it is too soon to say whether comprehensive health care 
regulation will ever subsume or directly incorporate principles of charities law.  For now, 
charities regulators need to remain vigilant in enforcing restrictions on charitable assets in 
health care.  Assets devoted to non-revenue-producing efforts such as research, teaching, and 
development of treatment for rare or so-called “orphan” conditions need to be safeguarded and 
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applied to those purposes.  Otherwise, they may be redirected to more generic health care 
operations in an effort to control costs of general health care services.  Over time, the health 
care regulatory structure may encompass some of these activities as well.  For example, as 
research that translates findings from basic science to practical applications brings innovative 
and expensive diagnostic and treatment technology to the bedside, traditional health insurance is 
unlikely to cover the costs for any individual patient. Yet society as a whole will benefit from 
supporting these efforts. 
Charities regulators need to continue to guard against conversion of charitable health 
care assets to private gain; to ensure that restricted assets (i.e., those given for a purpose 
narrower than the recipient’s general purposes) are protected; and to guard against breaches in 
the duty of loyalty through conflicts of interest.  Attorneys general should continue supporting 
the goals of transparency and preservation of the public’s interest in health care charitable assets 
and operations, which appears to be consistent with the goals of health care regulatory bodies. 
We see the need for health care expertise and input in application of charities law standards in 
the health care arena, and also the potential for aspects of charities regulation and enforcement 
in the health care arena to be exercised in collaboration with health care regulatory bodies.  
While health care related charitable purposes can and should be reconciled with the public’s 
interest and the common good arising from the health care system as a whole, charities law 
standards and the authority underlying them remain distinct, and we stop short of predicting that 
substantive health care regulation will subsume charities law in health care. 
 
